ABSTRACT:While tone at the top is widely regarded as an important predictor of ethical behavior in organizations, we argue that recent research overlooks the various conflicting ethical tones present in many multi-organizational work settings. Further, we propose that the resolution processes promulgated in many firms and professional associations to reconcile this conflict reinforce the tone at the bottom or a tone at the top of the employee’s organization, and that both of these approaches can conflict with the tone at the (...) top of other important organizations such as professional and regulatory organizations. Here we adapt Integrative Social Contract Theory’s priority rules to propose a multi-tone reconciliation process which prioritizes conflicting ethical tones based upon features of the organization and the effects on society. Using three contextualizations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the multi-tone reconciliation process over current processes. We conclude with recommendations for future research and implications for practice. (shrink)

The Dobbs decision will directly affect patients and reproductive rights; it will also impact patients indirectly in many ways, one of which will be changes in the physician workforce through its impact on graduate medical education. Current residency accreditation standards require training in all forms of contraception in addition to training in the provision of abortion. State bans on abortions may diminish access to training as approximately half of obstetrics and gynecology residency programs are in states with significant abortion restrictions. (...) The Dobbs decision creates numerous hurdles for trainees and their programs. Trainees in restrictive states will have to travel to learn in a different program in a protective state. As training opportunities diminish, potentially leading to a decline in clinical skills, knowledge, and experience in the provision of abortion, the rate of complications and maternal mortality are likely to rise. This will likely have a disproportionately negative effect on preexisting disparities in reproductive health fueled by a longstanding history of systemic racism and inequities. This work aims to both define the looming problem in abortion training created by Dobbs and propose solutions to ensure that an adequate workforce is available in the future to serve patient needs. (shrink)

How do English‐speaking children inflect nouns for plurality and verbs for the past tense? We assess theoretical answers to this question by considering errors of omission, which occur when children produce a stem in place of its inflected counterpart (e.g., saying “dress” to refer to 5 dresses). A total of 307 children (aged 3;11–9;9) participated in 3 inflection studies. In Study 1, we show that errors of omission occur until the age of 7 and are more likely with both sibilant (...) regular nouns (e.g., dress) and irregular nouns (e.g., man) than regular nouns (e.g., dog). Sibilant nouns are more likely to be inflected if they are high frequency. In Studies 2 and 3, we show that similar effects apply to the inflection of verbs and that there is an advantage for “regular‐like” irregulars whose inflected form, but not stem form, ends in d/t. The results imply that (a) stems and inflected forms compete for production and (b) children generalize both product‐oriented and source‐oriented schemas when learning about inflectional morphology. (shrink)

Kant est un interlocuteur fréquent et majeur de Hans Jonas. Il l?est assurément en philosophie pratique. Il lui est à la fois un repoussoir et un modèle à cet égard. Le Kant de la première Critique n?est pas non plus absent de l??uvre de Jonas, et il ne l?est pas, en particulier, du Phénomène de la vie , même s?il y est présent de manière assez sporadique. Mais un Kant dont l?absence est notable dans ce projet de biologie philosophique qui (...) entend rétablir, contre les sciences modernes, les droits du concept de finalité, c?est le Kant de la troisième Critique et singulièrement celui qui s?attelle à l?étude du jugement téléologique. Le titre de la Critique de faculté de juger n?est pas mentionné. Cette absence peut faire question et elle donne un angle d?attaque pour interroger le statut du projet jonassien dans le Phénomène de la vie . De manière abrupte : cette absence n?autorise-t-elle pas à penser que le projet est simplement précritique ? Quel autre sens pourrait-on donner à cette absence, et de quels indices dispose-t-on à cet égard ? Détecte-t-on, à seconde vue, une présence implicite de Kant ? On se contentera de poser ici quelques jalons dans l?instruction de ce dossier. Et l?on se gardera bien de prétendre à quelque démonstration que ce soit. Retournons donc à l?énoncé du projet de Jonas, et d?abord, inévitable­ment, à un très bref rappel des thèses kantiennes, pour baliser. (shrink)

Images of vulnerability have populated the philosophical landscape from Hobbes to Hegel, Levinas to Foucault, often designating a sense of corporeal susceptibility to injury, or of being threatened or wounded and therefore have been predominantly associated with violence, finitude, or mortality. More recently, feminist theorists such as Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero have begun to rethink corporeal vulnerability as a critical or ethical category, one based on our primary interdependence and intercorporeality. However, many contemporary theorists continue to associate vulnerability with (...) violence and finitude rather than providing an account of the normative theory that might underpin vulnerability as a critical category. In this article, I explore an alternative notion of vulnerability in relation to both a theory of power and a normative account that draws on recognition theory. My aim in this article is twofold: first, to examine the complexity of vulnerability and how it relates to forms of recognition; second, to outline how the notion of vulnerability can operate as the basis for critiquing objectionable forms of vulnerability. This is to consider vulnerability not only as an ethical or ontological question but as a political one, and shifts arguments about its abuse and entanglement with power and violence to the public political sphere. (shrink)

Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) gilt - neben Max Weber - als einer der beiden Gründerväter der modernen Soziologie. Er hat durch seine materialen Arbeiten nicht nur so zentrale soziologische Teildisziplinen wie die Religions-, Wissens-, Familien- und Rechtssoziologie begründet, sondern insbesondere durch sein theoretisches Werk der Soziologie als eigenständiger Wissenschaft den Weg geebnet. Hierzu trug er nicht zuletzt auch durch die Begründung einer soziologischen Zeitschrift und Formierung einer eigenen Denkschule bei. Trotz seines internationalen Renommees blieb sein Werk in der deutschen Theoriediskussion stets (...) eigentümlich vernachlässigt. Der erste Einführungsband über das Werk Durkheims in deutscher Sprache beschreibt die zeitgeschichtlichen und biografischen Hintergründe seines Lebens und erläutert die Ausgangsprobleme, die die Soziologie in den Augen ihres Begründers lösen sollte. Die Quintessenz seines soziologischen Werks wird in der Begründung einer rationalen Moral resümiert. Nach der Ausleuchtung der konkreten Gestalt, die Durkheim dem soziologischen Denken übertrug, widmet sich Daniel Šuber eingängig der wissenssoziologischen Relevanz des Durkheim'schen Werks. Gilt er gemeinhin nicht als deren Begründer, wird hier gezeigt, wie tief sein Denkansatz von der wissenssoziologischen Grundidee der ”Seinsbedingtheit allen Denkens“ (Mannheim) von Beginn an geprägt war. Die rekonstruierten Fallbeispiele werden dem religionssoziologischen Spätwerk, aber auch seinen früheren Arbeiten zur Familien-, Erziehungs- und Moralsoziologie entnommen. Abschließend wird die über ethnologische Autoren (E.E. Evans-Pritchard, C. Lévi-Strauss, M. Douglas) vermittelte Wirkungsgeschichte des Durkheim'schen Werks in der Nachkriegssoziologie skizziert. (shrink)

The greatest change, once it is accomplished, is simply the outcome of a vast series of adaptations and responsive accommodations, each to its own particular situation.”1It is in no way controversial to say that the U.S. health care system is failing to serve many of its citizens satisfactorily. While it is certainly true that most U.S. citizens are dissatisfied with our current health care system, creating agreement through open dialogue on what, more precisely, is wrong with the system, as well (...) as on what we should do to fix the system, seems to many to be impossibly optimistic. Leonard Fleck, professor of philosophy and medical ethics at Michigan State University and author of Just Caring: The Ethical .. (shrink)

We argue that it would seem to be a mistake to blame Liar-like paradox on certain features of the object language, since the effect can be created with very minimal object languages that contain none of the usual suspects (truth-like predicates, reference to their own truth-bearers, negation, etc.).

A principal aim of Chateaubriand’s Logical Forms II: Logic, Language, and Knowledge is to clarify and defend what Chateaubriand describes as the ontological conception of logic against the standard model-theoretic or “linguistic” view. Both sides to the debate accept that if logic is a science then there must be logically necessary facts that this science discovers, Chateaubriand arguing that because logic is a science, there must be logically necessary facts, and his opponent that because there are no logically necessary facts, (...) logic cannot be a science. I argue that we can go between the horns of this dilemma by showing that, although logic is a science, it does not follow, as Chateaubriand assumes, that there are logically necessary facts. There are truths of logic; there are no “logical truths”.Um dos objetivos principais de Logical Forms II: Logic, Language and Knowledge de Chateaubriand é clarificar e defender o que ele descreve como a concepção ontológica da lógica, contra a visão predominante, modelo-teórica ou “lingüística”. Os dois lados do debate aceitam que, se a lógica é uma ciência, então deve haver fatos logicamente necessários que esta ciência descobre; Chateaubriand argumenta que, porque a lógica é ciência, deve haver fatos necessários que ela descobre, enquanto seus oponentes argumentam que, porque não há fatos logicamente necessários, a lógica não pode ser uma ciência. Eu argumento que podemos tomar uma via intermediária entre estes dois lados do dilema mostrando que, ainda que a lógica seja uma ciência, não se segue, como Chateaubriand assume, que existem fatos logicamente necessários. Existem verdades da lógica; não existem “verdades lógicas”. (shrink)

(from the jacket) This book addresses the richness and depth of our personal relationships, especially those moments when we come to see ourselves and the other person in a new way. In such moments, Halling argues that we realize that however much we are influenced by heredity and upbringing, we are also agents with the capacity for openness and transcendence. Drawing upon qualitative research and stories, Halling discusses everyday experiences of surprise, including breakthroughs in relationships, disillusionment, and forgiveness, and emphasizes (...) the power of discovering another person's point of view. Halling demonstrates how the approach of phenomenological psychology allows us to do justice to human existence and especially to our capacity for transcendence and intimacy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This paper addresses the need for, and ultimately proposes, an educational framework to develop competencies in attending to ethical issues in mental health and substance use health (MHSUH) in healthcare ethics consultation (HCEC). Given the prevalence and stigma associated with MHSUH, it is crucial for healthcare ethicists to approach such matters skillfully. A literature review was conducted in the areas of bioethics, health professions education, and stigma studies, followed by quality improvement interviews with content experts to gather feedback on the (...) framework’s strengths, limitations, and anticipated utility. The proposed framework describes three key concepts: first, integrating self-reflexive practices into formal, informal, and hidden curricula; second, embedding structural humility into teaching methods and contexts of learning; and third, striking a balance between critical consciousness and compassion in dialogue. The proposed educational framework has the potential to help HCEC learners enhance their understanding and awareness of ethical issues related to structural stigma and MHSUH. Moreover, context-specific learning, particularly in MHSUH, can play a significant role in promoting competency-building among healthcare ethicists, allowing them to address issues of social justice effectively in their practice. Further dialogue is encouraged within the healthcare ethics community to further develop the concepts described in this framework. (shrink)

Throughout its long history, mathematics has involved the use ofsystems of written signs, most notably, diagrams in Euclidean geometry and formulae in the symbolic language of arithmetic and algebra in the mathematics of Descartes, Euler, and others. Such systems of signs, I argue, enable one to embody chains of mathematical reasoning. I then show that, properly understood, Frege’s Begriffsschrift or concept-script similarly enables one to write mathematical reasoning. Much as a demonstration in Euclid or in early modern algebra does, a (...) proof in Frege’s concept-script shows how it goes. (shrink)

Recent corporate social initiatives (CSIs) have garnered criticisms from a wide range of audiences due to perceived inconsistencies. Some critics use the label “woke” when CSIs are perceived as inconsistent with the firm’s purpose. Other critics use the label “woke washing” when CSIs are perceived as inconsistent with the firm’s practices or values. I will argue that this derogatory use of woke is stigmatizing, leads to claims of hypocrisy, and can cause stakeholder backlash. I connect this process to our own (...) field by considering inconsistencies in our organizations and in our teaching that could garner similar criticisms. After describing the stigmatization process, I consider the moral implications of inconsistencies for CSIs and draw parallels to our field. I end by suggesting next steps for our field in response to the stigmatization of CSIs and to guard against the stigmatization of our own work. (shrink)

If bioethics should care about the environment, this could be, among other ways, by reflecting on certain radical solutions, such as biomedical human engineering. In a recent article, Liao, Sandberg and Roache consider reducing human size through biomedical treatments in order to mitigate climate change. In this viewpoint, we point out that the various methods used to reduce human height, be they sophisticated tech­ nologies or mere undernutrition, seem all subject to highly undesirable consequences. This is to show that one (...) of the problems with Liao et al.’s account is that it does not provide us with an ethical framework com­ prehensive enough to balance these consequences with the problematic effects of climate change. In sum, we wish to draw from the discussion of this specific example a more general claim. This claim is that, even if we accept that human engineering per se is not problematic, we nevertheless need a more comprehensive ethical theory than the mere claim that climate change should be mitigated in order to assess the desirability of human engineering. (shrink)

The idea that social and political institutions can be designed in order to achieve specific human ends goes back, at least, to Plato’s presentation of the appropriate form of the just city-state i...

This study examines the metajournalistic discourse reflected in the use of corpse images from the DusitD2 terror attack in Nairobi, Kenya, in January 2019. Drawing from concepts such as responsibility and resistance ethics, this study explores the viewpoints of Kenyan journalists and bloggers. Situated within qualitative research methodology, the findings suggest that the New York Times’ use of victims’ corpse images reflects a double standard and visual bias, and its defense of the news report can be considered an example of (...) professional posturing. Conversely, sharing of perpetrators’ postmortem pictures produced mixed findings among audiences. While online circulation was blamed on bloggers’ inexperience, it was also seen as a sign of victory for the value of visual evidence. This study also contributes to the scholarship on use of graphic images by drawing on African ethical systems and just war theory. (shrink)

Within bioethics as well as in broader clinical practice, support for transgender and gender‐questioning adolescent access to pubertal suppression has often relied heavily on the desire to prevent risky, self‐destructive, and suicidal behavior. We argue that framing justifications for access to puberty suppression in this way can actually be harmful to both individual patients as well as to the broader trans population. This justification for access to care makes such access precarious, limits its scope, and introduces perverse incentives to the (...) patient population that is being served. We go on to offer an alternative, positive defense of access to puberty‐blocking treatment for transgender youth grounded in the child's right to an open future. We argue that decisions related to pubertal suppression are both importantly weighty and potentially irreversible, and show why this justification is preferable to so‐called “informed consent” approaches. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a specific challenge for welfarist theories of intergenerational justice. Subjective welfarism permits and even requires that a generation, G1, inculcates cheap preferences in the next generation, G2. This would allow G1 to deplete resources instead of saving them, which seems to contradict the ideal of sustainability. The aim of the paper is to show that, even if subjective welfarism requires the cultivation of cheap preferences among future generations, it can accommodate two major objections to cheap preferences (...) engineering, the Autonomy Objection and the Fairness Objection. The paper argues that teaching autonomy-related abilities is compatible with cheap preferences engineering insofar as autonomy is understood as an end-state and not as a precondition. Furthermore, teaching autonomy-related abilities could even be required in order to improve G2’s prospects for well-being. However, since being autonomous renders G2 able to revise their initially cheap preferences, G1 should also save enough resources to enable members of G2 to do so. Therefore, cultivating cheap preferences among G2 does not allow G1 to deplete the available resources. (shrink)

La présence d’un représentant du public dans les CER est obligatoire depuis 1998. Le rôle de celui-ci consiste à « aider à élargir les perspectives et les valeurs du CER afin de favoriser le dialogue et la transparence avec les groupes locaux ». Cette exigence inscrite dans la perspective d’une démocratie représentative soulève néanmoins de délicates questions tant au niveau de l’interprétation du concept de représentation que sur le plan de son application pratique dans le cadre des CER. Le représentant (...) du public parle-t-il en sage à la place des membres de la communauté ou bien est-il leur mandataire en les rendant présents dans le processus de décision? La réponse comporte d’importantes retombées pratiques : qui peut être représentant du public? Sur quelles compétences et légitimités repose ce rôle? Quel est le mode de nomination le plus apte à satisfaire les exigences énoncées? Quels liens doivent exister entre le représentant du public et la communauté qu’il représente? Ces questions permettent de jeter un regard sur la façon dont les CER et la pratique de l’éthique de la recherche s’insèrent dans la démarche démocratique. (shrink)

François Viète is often regarded as the first modern mathematician on the grounds that he was the first to develop the literal notation, that is, the use of two sorts of letters, one for the unknown and the other for the known parameters of a problem. The fact that he achieved neither a modern conception of quantity nor a modern understanding of curves, both of which are explicit in Descartes’ Geometry, is to be explained on this view “by an incomplete (...) symbolization rather than by any obstacle intrinsic in the system.” Descartes’ Geometry provides only a “clearer expression” of themes already sounded in Viète’s work, one that perfects Viète’s literal calculus and gives it “its modern form”; it merely continues the “‘new’ and ‘pure’ algebra which Viète first established as the ‘general analytic art’.” It can seem, furthermore, that this must be right, that had there been some obstacle intrinsic to Viète’s system that barred the way to a modern conception of quantity and a modern understanding of curves, then Descartes’ Geometry would have had to have taken a very different form than it did. As it was, Descartes had only to improve Viète’s symbolism, free himself of the last vestiges of the ancient view of geometrical and arithmetical objects, and apply the new symbolism to the study of curves in order to achieve what Viète did not but could have. But what, really, is the status of this “could have”; what would it actually have taken for Viète to achieve Descartes’ results in the Geometry? The interest of the question lies in its potential to better our understanding of the nature of modern mathematics. (shrink)

Russell’s theory of descriptions in “On Denoting” has long been hailed as a paradigm of the sort of analysis that is constitutiue of philosophical understanding. It is not the only model of logical analysis available to us, however. On Frege’s quite different view, analysis provides not a reduction of some problematic notion to other, unproblematic ones -- as Russell’s analysis does -- but instead a deeper, clearer articulation of the very notion with which we began. This difference, I suggest, is (...) grounded in their two very different conceptions of the nature of language / thought; and it grounds in turn two very different conceptions of the nature of philosophical understanding. (shrink)

Firearms were associated with 30,136 deaths in the United States in 2003; of these, 11,920 were homicides. For every firearm homicide, there are four people who suffer non-fatal firearm assaults. Like many other consumer products in the US, most guns are initially sold to the public through a network of retail dealers. Persons in the business of selling firearms must obtain a federal firearm dealer's license. There were more than 54,000 federally licensed gun dealers in the United States in 2005, (...) though this reflects a seventy-eight percent decline since 1994. Some states also require a state license to sell firearms.Licensed firearm dealers are an important source of guns for criminals and gun traffickers. In one analysis of gun trafficking investigations conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, licensed dealers accounted for a plurality of all guns diverted to the illegal market. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger est sans aucun doute l'un des penseurs majeurs du XXe siècle, si ce n'est le penseur du XXe siècle, au sens où sa pensée permet d'entrer en intelligence avec notre temps, ouvrant par là une voie profondément méditante vers ce qui vient à nous. Mais l'oeuvre de ce philosophe a aussi la réputation d'être difficile d'accès, en raison précisément de l'originalité de son travail. Comme il le disait lui-même de ses travaux : "Ils ne sont pas des oeuvres (...) mais des chemins". Pour s'engager sur la bonne voie, un guide est de toute évidence bienvenu. Danielle Moyse se charge ici de nous accompagner en se gardant bien de nous servir un exposé magistral ; elle nous invite plutôt, par le récit de son propre chemin, à l'écoute d'une parole philosophique inouïe. S'étant particulièrement attachée aux questions éthiques relatives au handicap, au dépistage prénatal et à l'euthanasie, elle éclaire pour nous des problèmes devenus aujourd'hui cruciaux et qui trouvent dans l'oeuvre de Heidegger un espace où la méditation est essentielle. (shrink)

We discuss explanation of an earlier event by a later event, and argue that prima facie cases of backwards event explanation are ubiquitous. Some examples: (1) I am tidying my flat because my brother is coming to visit tomorrow. (2) The scarlet pimpernels are closing because it is about to rain. (3) The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon. We then look at various ways people might attempt to explain away these prima facie cases by arguing (...) that in each case the 'real' explanation is something else. We argue that none of the explaining-away strategies are successful, and so any plausible account of explanation should either make room for backwards explanation, or have a good story to tell about why it doesn't have to. (shrink)

Much of our thinking focuses on deciding what to do in situations where the space of possible options is too large to evaluate exhaustively. Previous work has found that people do this by learning the general value of different behaviors, and prioritizing thinking about high-value options in new situations. Is this good-action bias always the best strategy, or can thinking about low-value options sometimes become more beneficial? Can people adapt their thinking accordingly based on the situation? And how do we (...) know what to think about in novel events? Here, we developed a block-puzzle paradigm that enabled us to measure people's thinking plans and compare them to a computational model of rational thought. We used two distinct response methods to explore what people think about—a self-report method, in which we asked people explicitly to report what they thought about, and an implicit response time method, in which we used people's decision-making times to reveal what they thought about. Our results suggest that people can quickly estimate the apparent value of different options and use this to decide what to think about. Critically, we find that people can flexibly prioritize whether to think about high-value options (Experiments 1 and 2) or low-value options (Experiments 3, 4, and 5), depending on the problem. Through computational modeling, we show that these thinking strategies are broadly rational, enabling people to maximize the value of long-term decisions. Our results suggest that thinking plans are flexible: What we think about depends on the structure of the problems we are trying to solve. (shrink)

In Making It Explicit Brandom distinguishes between, as he puts it, I–We and I–Thou sociality. Only I–Thou sociality, Brandom argues, is adequate to the task of instituting norms relevant to our self–understanding as rational beings because only I–Thou sociality can render intelligible the distinction between how norms are applied and how they ought to be applied —however anyone thinks they ought to be applied. In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein defends a version of I–We sociality, one that is not, I argue, (...) subject to Brandom’s criticisms. Indeed, I suggest, it is just such a conception of I–We sociality as we find in Wittgenstein’s Investigations that is needed if we are fully to understand the respects in which we are, as the rational beings we are, answerable to the norm of truth. (shrink)

Prouver des théorèmes est une pratique mathématique qui semble clairement améliorer notre compréhension mathématique. Ainsi, prouver et reprouver des théorèmes en mathématiques, vise à apporter une meilleure compréhension. Cependant, comme il est bien connu, les preuves mathématiques totalement formalisées sont habituellement inintelligibles et, à ce titre, ne contribuent pas à notre compréhension mathématique. Comment, alors, comprendre la relation entre prouver des théorèmes et améliorer notre compréhension mathématique. J'avance ici que nous avons d'abord besoin d'une notion différente de preuve (formelle), qui (...) ne tienne pas la forme pour opposée au contenu. La pratique de la preuve algébrique au xviiie siècle fournit un exemple de preuve à la fois pleinement rigoureuse et porteuse de contenu, et dans ce cas, il est possible de voir comment une preuve mathématique apporte une compréhension mathématique. Il s'agira alors de mobiliser les enseignements de cet exemple pour étudier le type de raisonnement déductif à partir de concepts, qui a constitué la norme dans la pratique mathématique depuis le xixe siècle. (shrink)

Surveillance is a core function of all public health systems. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have deployed traditional public health surveillance responses, such as contact tracing and quarantine, and extended these responses with the use of varied technologies, such as the use of smartphone location data, data networks, ankle bracelets, drones, and big data analysis. Applying Foucault’s (1979) notion of the panopticon, with its twin focus on surveillance and self-regulation, as the preeminent form of social control in modern societies, we (...) examine the increasing levels of surveillance enacted during this pandemic and how people have participated in, and extended, this surveillance, self-regulation, and social control through the use of digital media. Consideration is given to how such surveillance may serve public health needs and/or political interests and whether the rapid deployment of these extensive surveillance mechanisms risks normalizing these measures so that they become more acceptable and then entrenched post-COVID-19. (shrink)

As a political thinker nurtured in early 20th-century German, Hannah Arendt is most often identified with the Greek philosophical tradition. This article argues that the crisis in reality that threw her into politics also, though unacknowledgedly, threw her into ‘Jewish modes of thinking’ as an alternative source where she found the Greek tradition lacking. This claim is controversial, given Arendt’s vehement criticisms of any recourse to the absolute, or metaphysical truths in the realm of politics. Nevertheless, and consistent with a (...) number of early 20th-century Jewish thinkers who explicitly identified the Hebrew God not as the metaphysical but as the condition of possibility for authentic freedom under conditions of finitude, one finds in Arendt a move towards an understanding of the seat of human freedom that sits far more comfortably in the Jerusalem than in the Athens tradition. Specifically, in her emphasis on natality and genuine futurity, one senses a strong resonance with the notion of pure creation in the Hebrew Bible, as one does, notably, in her insistence that forgiveness and promises form the two pillars for human sociality. Throughout the history of Jewish thought, one consistently finds precisely this Arendtian struggle to represent a model of law that holds the tension between binding fidelity to promises, memory and the past, and an openness to futurity, to the infinity of interpretation that gives meaning to those promises. Closely resembling the midrashic tradition, Arendt’s political community of speech is one in which meaning is open ended and plural, allowing for the binding together that sustains a polity, while also opening up to the radically new of each new birth. (shrink)

Dix ans apres la mort de Hans Jonas, qu'en est-il de la reception de sa philosophie? L'incroyable succes qu'elle connut s'explique par l'actualite d'un de ses themes principaux: la necessite d'une responsabilite nouvelle a l'egard des generations futures. Mais la reception largement negative que provoqua sa vulgarisation dans les domaines de l'ethique envireonnementale ou de la bioethique ne laisse pas de masquer le fondement de cette philosophie et les conditions memes de la mise en place des thematiques nouvelles qui retinrent (...) d'abord l'attention. S'alimentant a des sources tantot cachees, tantot eclectiques, elle s'est developpee au cours de plusieurs periodes dont le philosophe lui-meme disait ne pas voir ce qu'elles avaient en commun... Susceptible d'etre abordee par des voies multiples, cette oeuvre reste encore un defi pour le penseur et l'historien de la philosophie qui veulent la prendre au serieux et qui sont soucieux de la reconstruire et d'en lever tous les mysteres. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article traces the reception of Hume's ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’ (1752) among a circle of Scottish Whigs supportive of the French Revolution. While the influence of Hume's essay on American Federalists like James Madison has long been a subject of debate, historians have overlooked the appeal that the plan held for Hume's intellectual heirs in Scotland. In the early 1790s, theorists such as John Millar, James Mackintosh, and Dugald Stewart believed European governments – above all France – (...) could progress in the direction of the ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’. Hume modelled his plan after The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) by James Harrington. In so doing, he helped transmit a version of institutional republicanism to a generation of Scottish intellectuals searching for more explicit political reforms. Thinkers like Millar and Stewart interpreted Hume's essay as both a justification for idealist political ‘speculation’ and a ‘practicable’ plan for rebalancing political power in a large commercial state. (shrink)